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Abstract 
We examine the effects of multiple sources of noise in risky decision making. Noise in 
the parameters that characterise an individual’s preferences can combine with noise in the 
response process to distort observed choice proportions. Thus underlying preferences that 
conform to expected value maximization can appear to show systematic risk aversion or risk 
seeking. Similarly, core preferences that are consistent with expected utility theory, when 
perturbed by such noise, can appear to display non-linear probability weighting. For this reason, 
modal choices cannot be used simplistically to infer underlying preferences. Quantitative model 
fits that do not allow for both sorts of noise can lead to wrong conclusions.  
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Introduction 
Research on risky choice has relied heavily on the use of deterministic utility 
maximization models, such as expected utility theory (EUT) (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 
1947) and cumulative prospect theory (CPT) (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1992). When their functional forms are specified and parameterized, these models 
make precise quantitative predictions. However, they fail to capture an important aspect of actual 
choice behavior: namely, that choice is stochastic, so that decision makers may respond 
differently when given exactly the same choice problem on more than one occasion within a 
short space of time: see Mosteller & Nogee (1951) for early evidence and Luce & Suppes (1965) 
for a discussion; Rieskamp, Busemeyer & Mellers (2006), Wilcox (2008), and Marley & 
Regenwetter (2016) provide more recent reviews of key issues.  
There are two main ways in which stochasticity in choice has been accommodated. One 
approach involves allowing for some error in selecting the utility maximizing option, with the 
overall choice probabilities being determined by the relative utilities of the gambles in 
consideration (e.g. Luce, 1959; McFadden, 1973; Thurstone, 1927). An alternative approach 
allows the parameters of an individual’s utility function to vary from one moment to another, 
with choice probabilities being determined by the likelihood of one gamble having a higher 
utility than the other at a particular moment (e.g. Becker, DeGroot & Marschak, 1963; Loomes 
& Sugden, 1995). The first approach can be interpreted as involving response noise: that is, noise 
that applies after the utilities for the gambles have been determined according to some model and 
compared. In contrast, the second approach involves noise in the utility generation process itself: 
that is, variability in the decision maker’s underlying preferences.  
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 Many model-fitting studies use specifications which operate as if response noise is the 
only stochastic component of the decision process – e.g. Hey & Orme (1994), Andersen et al. 
(2008). However, this note warns that unless we allow for both forms of noise, false conclusions 
may be drawn about people’s underlying preferences.  
Risky Decision Models 
We can write two-outcome risky gambles as X = (x1, p1; x2, p2), so that X offers payoffs x1 
and x2 with probabilities p1 and p2, with p1 + p2 = 1. Using a power function formulation for the 
value of any payoff x and Prelec’s (1998) one-parameter probability weighting function, the EUT 
or CPT utility of X can be written as
1
:  
U(X|α,γ) = π(p1)∙x1
α 
+ (1- π(p1))∙x2
α              
   (1) 
where x1 ≥ x2 ≥ 0 and π(p1) = 𝑒−
(−ln 𝑝1)
𝛾
 and where we restrict α > 0 and γ > 0. CPT 
allows both α and γ to vary. When γ = 1, we have EUT as a special case of CPT. We obtain 
expected value when both α = 1 and γ = 1. When α < 1, concave value/utility functions produce 
risk averse choices under EUT, while α > 1 corresponds with risk seeking. When γ < 1, we have 
overweighting (underweighting) of small (large) probabilities, with γ > 1 producing the opposite.  
Aside from error, EUT and CPT models assume that X is always chosen over Y iff 
U(X|α,γ) > U(Y|α,γ). In order to accommodate probabilistic choice data, some variability must be 
incorporated. One approach been to assume that there is some error in the response such that the 
probability of selecting gamble X over Y is given by some increasing function of U(X|α,γ) - 
U(Y|α,γ). In many studies, this is implemented either by the logit model (Luce, 1959; McFadden, 
                                                          
1
 Numerous other functional forms are possible. Our conclusions do not depend upon the particular choices of 
functional form, as we illustrate in the supplemental materials. Also note that evidence suggests that both EUT and 
CPT have some descriptive limitations (Birnbaum, 2008; Starmer, 2000). However, our primary purpose is not to 
defend or advocate either theory: we simply take them as the two examples of risky utility maximization models, 
and explore the difficulties of inferring their parameters and distinguishing their predictions in the presence of both 
preference and response noise.  
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1973) or by the probit model (Thurstone, 1972). In the binary choice case, both models can also 
be interpreted as involving an additive (IID) error ε, with the median value of ε being 0, so that 
the probability of choosing X is the probability that U(X|α,γ) – U(Y|α,γ) + ε > 0 (Yellott, 1977).2 
We refer to variability added to the core utilities as ‘response noise’. 
 A second way of modelling stochastic choice involves allowing the parameters of 
decision makers to fluctuate (Becker et al., 1963; Loomes & Sugden, 1995). For example, 
suppose α = α* + ηα and γ = γ* + ηγ, where ηα and ηγ are symmetric random variables with E[ηα] 
= E[ηγ] = 0. ηα and ηγ, and thus α and γ, vary from trial to trial (but not between options in a 
given trial). Since the expected values of α and γ are E[α] = α* and E[γ] = γ*, α* and γ* 
characterize the central tendency of a decision maker’s underlying preferences.3  We refer to 
such variability in model parameters as ‘preference noise’. 
Preference noise and response noise can co-exist. For example, if we assume that 
response noise is given by the logit model, the choice probability of X generated by a particular 
realization of ηα and ηγ, and subsequently α = α* + ηα and γ = γ* + ηγ is: 
    P[𝑋, 𝑌|𝛼, 𝛾] =  
𝑒𝜃∙𝑈(𝑋|𝛼,𝛾)
𝑒𝜃∙𝑈(𝑋|𝛼,𝛾) + 𝑒𝜃∙𝑈(𝑌|𝛼,𝛾)
                (2)  
                                                          
2
 Although we present Luce’s and Thusrtone’s approach as being closely related, they do have diverging 
interpretations. Choice in Thurstone’s theory is often seen as involving the comparison of random variables or 
“discriminable processes”. In case 5 of this theory these random variables involve scale values (such as U(X|α,γ) and 
U(Y|α,γ)) combined with additive errors (such as ε). In contrast, Luce derives his theory from axiomatic restrictions 
on choice probabilities (see Marley & Regenwetter, 2016 or Wilcox, 2008 for an overview). There are also other 
related approaches which depart from the assumption that response noise is a function of only the utility differences 
(Carroll, 1980; Restle, 1961; Wilcox, 2011). For simplicity, we will not be explicitly examining the predictions of 
these approaches in this paper, though we do discuss them briefly in the supplemental materials.  
 
3
 This approach is closely related to models of stochastic ordering (Block & Marschak, 1960; Regenwetter, Dana & 
Davis-Stober, 2011; Regenwetter & Marley, 2001). These models involve relational preferences which are drawn at 
random, so that a decision maker chooses X or Y based on whether X ≻Y or Y ≻ X is sampled in any given trial 
(typically without any additional response noise or error). If variability in parameters were the only source of noise 
in the decision, then our above specification could be represented in terms of a random ordering.  
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Note that ηα and ηγ are random variables, so that the overall choice probability of X over 
Y in any given trial can be obtained by calculating the expectation of P[X,Y|α,γ] given the 
distribution of ηα and ηγ. θ is a parameter that is inversely proportional to the degree of response 
noise in the choice process. 
Theoretically, there are many reasons to assume both preference noise and response 
noise. Preferences (and in turn, the parameters that characterize these preferences) can fluctuate, 
reflecting variations in attitudes, noise in the process of deliberation, or changes in affective 
states. Additionally, there may be numerous factors (e.g. computational mistakes, inattention to 
some elements of the decision) that potentially overturn the decision maker’s underlying 
preference, with the frequency of such response errors depending on the relative desirability of 
the utility maximizing option.  
Empirically, the assumption of both preference noise and response noise can offer a more 
adequate account of choice data than each of these assumptions alone. For example, allowing for 
only response noise in the above framework generates much higher frequencies of violations of 
transparent dominance than are generally observed, while allowing for only preference noise 
leads to the prediction that dominance is never violated at all, contrary to the evidence (Loomes 
& Sugden, 1998; also see Butler, Isoni & Loomes, 2012 and Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993 for a 
related effect).  Likewise, EUT and CPT have been fit to choices elicited at different points in 
time (Glöckner & Pachur, 2012; Zeisberger, Vrecko & Langer, 2012). The fits assume only 
response noise, but the best-fit parameters also exhibit variability, with decision makers’ 
estimated preferences at one point in time being correlated with, but not identical to, their 
estimated preferences at a different point in time. Related work has fit EUT and CPT models 
permitting both response and preference noise, and has found that both types of noise are 
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necessary for the best quantitative fits (Blavatskyy & Pogrebna, 2010; Loomes, Moffatt & 
Sugden, 2002).  
Qualitative Inferences 
Noisy Risk Attitudes 
It might be thought that if both types of noise are unsystematic (symmetrically distributed 
around zero), modal choices can be used to make inferences about underlying preferences. This 
section tests that intuition and shows that it is incorrect. 
Consider the choice between a risky gamble X offering a 50% chance of obtaining $10 
and a 50% chance of obtaining $0, and its safe expected value equivalent Y offering $5 with 
certainty. Assume that a decision maker’s central tendency is described by the power form of 
EUT (i.e. γ = 1 in Equation 1) and that choices display both preference and response noise as 
specified in Equation 2. Suppose also that response noise involves θ = 1 and that preference 
noise involves ηα distributed uniformly in the interval [-0.5, 0.5]. Let α*
 
= 0.9 so that modal 
underlying preferences are risk averse. However, when response noise is added, Pr[X chosen] = 
0.53 > 0.5. Thus, despite underlying preferences predominantly favoring Y, the decision maker 
chooses the riskier X more frequently than Y.  
 This mismatch between underlying preferences and observed choices happens because of 
the nonlinearity of utility differences in α. The probability of choosing X is an increasing 
function of U(X|α,1) – U(Y|α,1) = 0.5∙10α - 5α. For the range of α we are considering, E[U(X|α,1) 
– U(Y|α,1)] > 0, resulting in a higher choice probability of X, despite the fact that α* < 1 and that 
U(X|α*,1) – U(Y|α*,1) < 0.  
 The point is expanded upon in Figure 1. We plot the probability of choosing X = ($10, 
0.5; $0, 0.5) over Y = ($5, 1) according to power function EUT with only response noise 
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(implemented via a logit function with θ = 1) and we compare that with the case where 
preference noise (with ηα distributed uniformly in the interval [-0.5,0.5]) is combined with the 
same specification of response noise. The first model entails Pr[X chosen] less than, equal to or 
greater than 0.5 according to whether α* is less than, equal to or greater than 1, as shown by the 
solid line in Figure 1. However, in the case when α is variable – shown by the broken line in 
Figure 1 – there is a range of values of α* between 0.87 and 1 where Pr[X chosen] > 0.5. Over 
this range, the decision maker’s expected modal choice suggests risk seeking whereas the central 
tendency of underlying preferences, represented by α*, suggests risk aversion or risk neutrality. 
In short, when both preference noise and response noise are present simultaneously, we cannot 
make reliable inferences about the decision maker’s risk attitude.4  
Noisy Probability Weighting: The Fourfold Pattern 
 We now turn to cases where probabilities may be transformed nonlinearly. We use the 
single parameter Prelec (1998) formulation outlined in Equation 1, but other transformation 
functions (Gonzalez & Wu, 1999; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) could be used without altering 
the essential conclusions. When γ < 1, this function overweights low probabilities and 
underweights high probabilities. Such an ‘inverse-S’ function is crucial to Tversky and 
Kahneman’s (1992) account of the ‘fourfold pattern’ of risky choice. 
In the positive domain considered here
5
, the fourfold pattern entails a risky gamble being 
chosen over its expected value when the probability of the higher payoff in the risky gamble is 
small, but the opposite pattern when the probability of the higher payoff in the risky gamble is 
                                                          
4
 In the supplemental materials we provide additional analysis demonstrating corresponding distortions for a variety 
of different gambles. 
 
5
 The other two aspects of the fourfold pattern pertain to the loss domain, where the mirror-image pattern is 
generated by the interaction between the probability weighting function and a loss function which exhibits 
diminishing sensitivity. 
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large. Thus in the choice between a risky gamble X
I
 offering a 1% chance of obtaining $10 and a 
99% chance of obtaining $0, and its safe expected value equivalent Y
I
 offering $0.10 with 
certainty, decision makers typically choose X
I
. In contrast, in the choice between a risky gamble 
X
II
 offering a 99% chance of obtaining $10 and a 1% chance of obtaining $0, and its safe 
expected value equivalent Y
II
 offering $9.90 with certainty, decision makers typically choose Y
II
.  
Consider a setting with both response and preference noise. Let α = 1, so that the value 
function is linear, and allow noise only in the γ parameter, with ηγ being distributed uniformly in 
the interval [-0.5, 0.5]. For response noise, use the logit function with θ = 1 as in the previous 
section.  Figure 2a shows the probability of choosing X
I
 over Y
I
 and Figure 2b shows the 
probability of choosing X
II
 over Y
II
. As shown by the solid line, a model with response noise only 
and with γ* = 1 entails for both pairs a 0.5 chance of choosing each option. For all γ* < 1, the 
risky option is the modal choice in Figure 2a while the sure amount is the modal choice in Figure 
2b. However, when γ exhibits preference noise, the effect – as shown by the broken line – is to 
shift the path up in Figure 2a and down in Figure 2b: the combination of preference and response 
noise increases the choice probability of X
I
 over Y
I
 and of Y
II
 over X
II
 for all γ* considered.  
At the point where α = 1 and γ* = 1 – that is, in the case where the underlying preference 
entails a risk neutral expected utility maximizer – the modal choices exhibit the ‘mixed attitude 
to risk’ typical of CPT with γ < 1. Indeed, there is a range of γ* between 1 and 1.15 for which the 
decision maker’s expected modal choices generate a preference for XI over YI and for YII over XII, 
a behavioral pattern associated with the overweighting of small probabilities, whereas that range 
of γ* represents an underweighting of small probabilities. Again, we cannot use modal choices to 
infer probability weighting if preference and response noise are present simultaneously.
6
  
                                                          
6
 The supplemental materials examine the robustness of this result, including the implications for Tversky and 
Kahneman’s (1992) fourfold pattern gambles. 
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Noisy Probability Weighting: The Common Ratio Effect 
 The probability weighting transformation assumed by CPT also enables it to account for 
the common-ratio effect (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). The classic common-ratio case involves 
choices between two pairs of lotteries. One pair offers a gamble X
III
 = (x, p; 0, 1-p) versus Y
III
 = 
(y, 1) where p is typically around 0.8 and where y is near the expected value of X
III
. In the 
example we consider, our scaled-up pair is a choice between a gamble X
III
 offering an 80% 
chance of obtaining $10 and a 20% chance of obtaining $0, and its expected value equivalent Y
III
 
offering $8 with certainty. For such a pair, decision makers typically choose the sure option Y
III
.  
The second pair involves scaling down the probabilities of the positive payoffs in the first 
pair by some factor  and correspondingly increasing the probabilities of 0 in both options to 
give a choice between X
IV
 = (x, p; 0, 1-p) and YIV = (y, ; 0, 1-). Letting  = 0.25 gives XIV 
offering a 20% chance of obtaining $10 and an 80% chance of $0 versus Y
IV
 offering a 25% 
chance of obtaining $8 and a 75% chance of $0. In such scaled-down pairs, decision makers 
choose the riskier option X
IV
 much more frequently. This is inconsistent with EUT, which 
assumes that preferences are linear in probabilities. In a deterministic world of EUT maximizers, 
whatever proportion of the sample chooses X
III
 in the first pair should also choose X
IV
 in the 
second pair.   
The change in modal choices often found in the data can be accommodated by CPT with 
γ < 1. This is illustrated by the solid lines in Figures 3a and 3b in which we fix α = 1, assume a 
logit noise term (with θ = 1) and let γ* range between 0.5 and 1.5. Over the range γ* < 1, a model 
with only response noise entails that Y
III
 is the modal choice in Figure 3a while X
IV
 is the modal 
choice in Figure 3b.  
NOISY PREFERENCES IN RISKY CHOICE  11 
 
Now allow response and preference noise to co-exist and let ηγ be distributed uniformly 
in the interval [-0.5, 0.5]. This produces a shift in the choice probabilities, with an increase in the 
choice probability of Y
III 
over X
III
 and of X
IV
 over Y
IV
 for γ* in the neighbourhood of 1. Thus, 
even when α = 1 and γ* = 1, the modal choices exhibit the reversal observed in many 
experiments, with a preference for Y
III 
in the scaled-up pair but a preference for X
IV
 in the scaled-
down pair. Here too, modal choices cannot be used to infer the underlying preference of decision 
makers: the common ratio effect can be generated by risk neutral expected utility maximizers.
7
  
Quantitative Inferences 
Recovering Risk Preferences 
In this section, we explore the effects on quantitative model fits if preference noise is 
neglected. Particularly, we simulate the choices of decision makers when the two forms of noise 
are present simultaneously and then examine what happens if we attempt to recover best-fit 
parameters with only response error modelled.  
We begin with EUT, considering only variability in the parameter α (i.e. restricting γ = 
1). We perform two sets of simulations: one in which α is deterministic, with α = α*, and another 
in which α is probabilistic, with α = α* + ηα and ηα distributed uniformly in the interval [-0.5, 
0.5]. We vary α* in the range [0.5, 1.5], and for each value of α* we simulate the corresponding 
EUT model on Stott’s (2006) gamble pairs.8 The best-fit values of α for the choices generated by 
the deterministic α simulation and probabilistic α simulation are then recovered. Our first 
                                                          
7
 In the supplemental materials we show that this effect also emerges for Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) classic 
common ratio gambles. 
 
8
 Specifically, we take α* values in the set {0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1.0, 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5}, which implies that α 
varies between 0 and 2 in the simulations. Response noise in utilities is generated by a logit choice function with θ = 
1. For each value of α*, the corresponding EUT model is simulated 1,000 times on Stott’s 90 gamble pairs. For each 
gamble in each simulation, the model’s choice is sampled according to the choice probability in Equation 2. Again 
note that the same sampled value of α is used for both options within a choice, but α varies across choices.  
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recovery involves α generated by the probabilistic α simulation, under the (incorrect) assumption 
that α is deterministic. This recovery can help us establish the degree to which parameter 
recovery is biased when the data generating model involves both sources of noise but the fitted 
model involves only response noise. The second recovery involves α for the choices generated 
by the probabilistic α simulation under the (correct) assumption that α is probabilistic.9 The third 
recovery involves α for the choices generated by the deterministic α simulation under the 
(correct) assumption that α is deterministic. These latter recoveries help us evaluate the efficacy 
of parameter estimates when the underlying model is correctly specified.
10
 
Figure 4a displays the median recovered α, from now on referred to as αfit, for each value 
of α* for each of the three parameter recoveries. It shows that αfit is very close to the 
corresponding α* when the fitted model is correctly specified. In contrast, αfit differs quite 
significantly from α* for the first recovery where the fitted model incorrectly assumes 
deterministic α when α is in fact probabilistic. In that case, the recovered parameter values are 
systematically biased. Particularly, αfit > α* when α* is small, but αfit < α* when α* is large. Thus 
highly risk averse decision makers appear less risk averse than they actually are, while risk 
neutral (α* = 1) and some risk seeking (α* = 1.1, 1.2) decision makers actually appear to be risk 
averse.  
Recovering Probability Weighting Parameters 
                                                          
9
 In this recovery, we approximate the continuous uniform distribution over parameter values present in data 
generating model (i.e. η uniform in [-0.5, 0.5]) with a discrete uniform distribution (η uniform over the set {0.5, 0.6, 
0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1.0, 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5}). This is done for computational tractability. However, it does mean that our 
data generating model is not perfectly identical to the fitted model. Ultimately, the mean squared error for the fits 
obtained as part of this recovery is an upper bound for the MSE that could be expected if the fitted model was 
perfectly specified. Also note that this recovery assumes that the variance in parameters (i.e. ηα distributed uniformly 
in the interval [-0.5, 0.5]) is known. A more complex recovery that also estimates parameter variance should be also 
be able to recover true parameters as already shown by Nilsson et al. (2011) and others.  
 
10
 Model-fits are performed by maximizing log-likelihood, and are implemented in MATLAB using the simplex 
routine, with starting points for each of the fits set at αstart = α* and θstart = 1. The use of these starting points ensures 
that any divergence between the true underlying parameters and the recovered parameters is not due to our fits 
converging on suboptimal local maxima.  
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To examine probability weighting biases, we perform two sets of simulations: one in 
which γ is deterministic, with γ = γ*, with only response noise; and another in which γ is also 
probabilistic, with γ = γ* + ηγ and ηγ distributed uniformly in the interval [-0.5, 0.5]. For both sets 
of simulations we take γ* values in the range [0.5, 1.5]. To focus on probability weighting biases, 
we fix α at 1. All other aspects of our parameter recovery exercise are identical to those in the 
previous section.  
Figure 4b displays the median recovered γ, from now on referred to as γfit, for each value 
of γ* for all three sets of recovered parameters. Again, the fitted value is very close to γ* in the 
second and third recoveries, when the fitted models are correctly specified. In contrast, γfit differs 
quite significantly from γ* for the first (mis-specified) recovery. Moreover, the recovered 
parameter values are systematically biased, with γfit < γ* for all the values of γ that we consider, 
for the first recovery. Decision makers without any central tendency disposition to transform 
probabilities (γ* = 1) appear to overweight small probabilities (with γfit < 1) if their choices are 
fit with the assumption that there is no parameter variability.  
The supplemental materials show that these parameter recovery biases also emerge when 
both α and γ are recovered together.  
Correlates of Risk Preference 
If it can be unsafe to infer an individual’s underlying preferences from modal choice 
patterns or from quantitative fits of models that only allow for response noise, it may also be 
unsafe to infer differences in preferences between different groups of individuals or between 
individuals in different experimental conditions.  
Between them, the disciplines of psychology, neuroscience, and economics have 
produced a large number of studies examining the relationship between risk preference and a 
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wide variety of social, biological, cultural, cognitive, emotional and neural variables. Much of 
this work makes the implicit or explicit assumption that differences in modal choice probabilities 
between different experimental or demographic groups reflect differences in underlying value 
functions and/or probability weighting preferences. 
For example, based on choice proportions, men are considered to be more risk seeking 
than women (Charness & Gneezy, 2012), a tendency that is amplified by contextual factors such 
as stereotype threat (Carr & Steele, 2010); Chinese are considered more risk seeking than 
Americans (Hsee & Weber, 1999); the nucleus accumbens is seen as influencing risk seeking 
choices whereas the anterior insula is seen as influencing riskless choices (Kuhnen & Knutson, 
2005); high incentives are associated with more risk aversion than low incentives (Holt & Laury, 
2005); and decision makers under high time pressure are seen as being more risk averse than 
decision makers under low time pressure (Zur & Breznitz, 1981). Likewise stress is seen as 
affecting the amount of probability weighting in gains and losses (Porcelli & Delgado, 2009); the 
degree of striatal activity is assumed to influence the overweighting of small probabilities (Hsu et 
al., 2009); framing the decision as involving precaution is assumed to lead to the overweighting 
of small and medium-sized probabilities (Kusev, van Schaik, Ayton, Dent & Chater, 2009); age 
has been argued to generate more optimistic decision weights in gains (Pachur, Mata & Hertwig, 
2016); and decision feedback is considered to lead to linear probability weighting (Jessup, 
Bishara & Busemeyer., 2008). Finally, is often assumed that decision makers tend to weigh 
probabilities differently when gamble payoffs and probabilities are described compared to when 
these payoffs and probabilities are experienced (Hertwig, Barron, Weber, & Erev, 2004).  
However, as we have shown, differences in modal choice proportions may be due to 
differences in the amount of variability in underlying parameters rather than to differences in 
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central tendency parameter values. To illustrate, let us return to Figure 1. The horizontal axis 
shows a range of α* and the vertical axis shows the choice probability for the risky gamble X 
corresponding with those different values of α*. The two lines reflect different levels of 
preference noise.  
Now suppose we observe a male decision maker choosing X with frequency 0.53 while a 
female decision maker chooses X with frequency 0.47. If we were only considering the raw 
choice data, we might conclude that the male is somewhat risk seeking and the female is 
somewhat risk averse. If we allow for preference noise but suppose that the degree of such noise 
is the same for both individuals, we could still attribute the gap to different values of α*, with the 
male identified as being less risk averse. But if the male’s underlying preferences involve more 
preference noise (the dotted line) than the female’s (the solid line), we cannot draw that 
conclusion. Mapping from Pr[X chosen] = 0.53 via the dotted line gives the male’s α* as about 
0.9, whereas mapping from Pr[X chosen] = 0.47 via the solid line gives the female’s α* as 
approximately 0.95, meaning that the male is, in terms of underlying preferences, actually more 
risk averse than the female.  
The same point may hold for differences in best-fitting parameters across demographic 
groups or experimental conditions. If decision makers display both preference and response 
noise, but if the fitted model allows for only response noise, differences in the degree of 
preference noise across groups could be incorrectly interpreted as differences in underlying 
parameters. It is hard to say, in general, just how substantial any such effect might be: one could 
imagine it being stronger in some instances and weaker or insignificant in others. Our point is 
not to reject out of hand all of the differences reported in the studies cited earlier, but rather to 
alert researchers to the possibility that the combination of parameter and response noise may in 
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some cases lead to mis-estimates of the degree (and occasionally even the direction) of such 
differences. 
Nonlinearity in Parameters 
In many ways, the above sections serve as an existence proof, showing how a 
combination of some types of preference and response noise can systematically distort choice 
probabilities. However, such effects are not limited to the particular functional forms of EUT and 
CPT, nor to the specifications of response and preference noise used in this paper. They are 
liable to apply whenever there is a nonlinear relationship between the parameters that describe 
preference and the utilities used to determine choice. In these circumstances, the means of the 
utility differences between options are liable to diverge from the utility differences generated by 
central tendency parameter values.  
The supplemental materials examine various settings in considerable detail. However, to 
illustrate, we consider a different domain: intertemporal choice. Here, the exponential 
discounting model (Frederick, Loewenstein & O’Donoghue, 2002; Samuelson, 1937) is 
commonly used to model choices between rewards occurring at differing periods of time. One 
criticism of this model is that it cannot account for an increased preference for a proximate 
reward over a delayed reward as the lengths of the delay diminish by some common amount. For 
example, this model predicts that decision makers cannot prefer $10 in three months and one 
week to $5 in three months, but also prefer $5 immediately to $10 in one week from now. Yet 
such present-biased choice patterns have often been reported, and they have been explained by 
alternative discount functions (see Frederick et al., 2002 for an overview). However, one could 
also explain such patterns using exponential discounting with preference noise. Indeed, if we use 
the exponential discounting model with a discount factor of δ = δ* + ηδ, with δ* = 0.75, E(ηδ) = 
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0, and ηδ uniform in [-0.25, 0.25], and if we assume (for simplicity) deterministic linear utility 
and a logistic response rule with θ = 1, we find that the probability of choosing $5 immediately 
over $10 in one week is 79% but that the probability of choosing $5 in three months over $10 in 
three months and one week is 48%. If we fail to allow for the role played by preference noise, 
this shift in modal choice may mislead us about the underlying time preferences of decision 
makers. Likewise, observed differences in intertemporal choice patterns that have been ascribed 
to differences in demographic, biological, neural, cognitive, emotion, social, and task-based 
factors may not exclusively reflect the impact of those factors on discount rates but might (to 
some extent, at least) reflect differences in the effects of noise. 
Appropriate Analysis 
We have seen how the combination of preference and response noise can bias parameter 
estimates if model fits assume that underlying preferences are deterministic when in reality they 
are not.
11
 However, this does not mean that models such as EUT and CPT are unidentifiable in 
the statistical sense: parameters can be recovered accurately so long as the model is correctly 
specified.  
Unlike current approaches to applying models like EUT and CPT (see e.g. Broomell & 
Bhatia, 2014; Glöckner & Pachur, 2012; Harless & Camerer, 1994; Hey & Orme, 1994; 
Rieskamp, 2008; Stott, 2006), an appropriate analysis would assume a distribution over 
underlying parameter values. Such a hierarchical approach has been shown to be desirable for 
capturing group-level variability in the parameters of cognitive models of choice (Lee & Newell, 
2011; Wetzels, Vandekerckhove, Tuerlinckx & Wagenmakers, 2010; also see mixture logit 
models as in Train, 2008). Indeed, a recent study, using hierarchical Bayesian estimation 
                                                          
11
 Note that the alternative type of misspecification also leads to incorrect inferences. If decision makers have both 
preference and response noise but it is (incorrectly) assumed that they have only preference noise, inferences made 
using either modal choices or model fits can be biased.  
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(Nilsson et al., 2011; also Scheibehenne & Pachur, 2015), showed how this technique could be 
used to model prospect theory preferences without bias in settings with heterogeneous decision 
makers. Even though this work did not consider within-person preference noise, the statistical 
structure they proposed is essentially equivalent to the structure assumed in this paper, 
suggesting that hierarchical Bayesian estimation could be used to recover model the predictions 
of CPT and EUT more accurately in the presence of preference noise at the individual level.  
Of course determining the correct model specification is not trivial. In this paper we have 
assumed a logistic model for response noise as well as an additive error model for preference 
noise. However, in reality this may not be the case. Indeed, other more sophisticated ways of 
modelling error have already been proposed (see Marley & Regenwetter, 2016 or Wilcox, 2008 
for an overview), and many of these have desirable properties not possessed by the logit model. 
Currently we are unable to correctly diagnose the underlying noise specification based solely on 
data, and much more work needs to be done in order to identify appropriate error theories for 
modelling response and preference noise.   
 Another way to avoid the choice biases documented in this paper might involve the Qtest 
method, which shows how choice proportions could be used to infer the underlying preferences 
of decision makers (Regenwetter et al., 2014; see also Regenwetter & Davis-Stober., 2012). This 
method attempts to characterize deterministic models with various stochastic assumptions in 
terms of the points on a multiple dimensional choice space that their choice predictions occupy. 
Currently this work appears to be applied either to deterministic models under the influence of 
response noise or else to random parameter specifications without response noise. However, we 
understand that the proponents of the QTest method are currently investigating the feasibility of 
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combining these two sources of noise: if this is computationally tractable, it might provide a 
useful way to conceptualize the issues discussed in this paper. 
A somewhat different line of development might build upon the true and error model 
(Birnbaum, 2013; Birnbaum & Bahara, 2012; Birnbaum & Diecidue, 2015). This approach 
assumes that decision makers have true preference orderings which are perturbed by errors but 
does not impose the kinds of functional restrictions assumed in our paper. Particularly, when 
presented with a number of choices within some block of questions in an experiment, an 
individual’s preferences are assumed to be consistent with some core (deterministic) theory 
throughout that block. However, the observed choices within that block may depart from that 
theory due to response error. In variants of this approach, it is also allowed that if the same 
choices are repeated in different blocks, the individual’s true preference might change from one 
block to another.  
It may be possible to control for some of the effects outlined in this paper using the true 
and error framework, and additionally use insights from this framework to identify necessary 
extensions and modifications of our own approach. For example, the experiments in Birnbaum 
(2013) suggest that preference noise is not independent and identically distributed, as assumed in 
this paper. Instead, there are cross-temporal correlations inherent in preferences. Indeed, one 
approach to modelling these correlations within a functional parametric structure has already 
been proposed by Birnbaum (2013, Appendix B), who suggests that parameters in utility 
functions can be seen to evolve according to a random walk process.  
Beyond Deterministic Models 
 We have used EUT and CPT to motivate and illustrate our arguments, but the issues we 
have discussed apply much more broadly. Although it has been known for more than half a 
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century that human decision making is probabilistic (Mosteller & Nogee, 1951; Luce & Suppes, 
1965), the evolution of modern decision theory has primarily involved the production of scores 
of deterministic models, whose developers have left the question of stochasticity in abeyance. 
When experimenters have tried to test these models, the most common strategy has been to add 
on some analytically convenient – but often rather arbitrary – ‘error’ specification. However, it 
has become clear that the relationship between these deterministic models and their stochastic 
implementations is such that it is possible to drastically change inferences made using these 
models by altering assumptions regarding the nature of the variability in the data. 
 This problem is endemic to deterministic models of choice, and cannot be fully remedied 
by the application of more rigorous methodological tools, even though the more recent 
techniques discussed in the previous section may represent improvements on simple logit 
specifications. We would argue that theoretical research on decision making should attempt to 
incorporate variability as part of the fabric of models rather than as ad hoc ways of giving a 
deterministic model a probabilistic appearance. There have already been a number of advances in 
modelling the cognitive basis of the stochastic choice process (Bhatia, 2013, 2014; Bogacz, 
Usher, Zhang, & McClelland, 2007; Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993; Diederich, 1997; Krajbich, 
Armel, & Rangel, 2010; Rangel & Hare, 2010; Roe, Busemeyer, & Townsend, 2001; Trueblood, 
Brown & Heathcote, 2014; Tsetsos, Chater & Usher, 2012; Usher & McClelland, 2004; see also 
Rieskamp et al., 2006 and Oppenheimer & Kelso, 2015 for useful discussions). Cognitive 
models of stochastic choice make explicit assumptions about how noise enters into deliberation, 
and how it interacts with preference, choice, decision time and confidence. In allowing 
stochasticity to play a central role in choice, these models are naturally able to capture a large 
range of behavioral effects that currently lie outside the descriptive scope of deterministic 
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models. Indeed, some of these models even try to explain key decision making anomalies using 
only unsystematic noise, rather than specific restrictions on value functions or probability 
weighting (Bhatia, 2014; Navarro-Martinez, Loomes, Isoni & Butler, 2015; also see e.g. Ratcliff 
& Rouder, 1998). Moreover, experimental work has shown that these types of models 
outperform many of the deterministic utility models in terms of quantitative fit (Rieskamp, 
2008). Future research should consider using these types of psychologically-grounded choice 
models to understand the behavior of decision makers.  
Conclusion 
We have shown that the co-existence of both preference noise and response noise – in 
each case modelled as zero-mean, symmetric, and independent – can systematically distort 
choice patterns. Thus decision makers whose preferences are, on average, risk neutral, can 
display modal choice patterns that might be mistaken as evidence of risk aversion or risk 
seeking. Likewise, underlying preferences may be linear in probabilities but choice patterns may 
appear supportive of nonlinear probability transformations. In fact, a number of common and 
seemingly systematic decision anomalies can be generated by expected value maximizers with 
some degree of response and preference noise.   
Our analysis suggests the need for care when trying to elicit the underlying preferences of 
decision makers. The presence of both preference and response noise can bias quantitative model 
fits if these fits do not make appropriate allowance for both sources of noise. Likewise, 
differences in choice proportions between various categories of decision makers may be due, at 
least to some extent, to different degrees of noise rather than being entirely attributable to 
intrinsic differences. In short, caution is needed when trying to infer the preferences of decision 
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makers, or when trying to identify the effects of psychological, biological, economic and 
demographic variables on those preferences. 
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Figure 1. The probability of choosing a risky gamble X over its expected value Y for varying 
values of α*, plotted with only response noise (solid line) and with both response and preference 
noise (dashed line). Here we can observe a higher choice probability of X over Y for some values 
of α* < 1 in the presence of preference noise.  
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Figures 2a and 2b. The probability of choosing a low-probability risky gamble X
I
 over its 
expected value Y
I
 (left panel) and the probability of choosing a high-probability risky gamble X
II
 
over its expected value Y
II
 (right panel), for varying values of γ*. These figures are plotted with 
only response noise (solid line) and with both response and preference noise (dashed line).  
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Figures 3a and 3b. The probability of choosing a scaled-up risky gamble X
III
 over its expected 
value Y
III
 (left panel) and the probability of choosing a scaled-down risky gamble X
IV
 over its 
expected value equivalent safe gamble Y
VI
 (right panel), for varying values of γ*. These 
probabilities are plotted with only response noise (solid line) and with both response and 
preference noise (dashed line).  
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Figures 4a and 4b. Median recovered values of α, αfit, plotted against α
*
 (left panel) and median 
recovered values of γ, γfit, plotted against γ
*
 (right panel). The first parameter recovery (R1) 
involves a data generating model with both response and preference noise and misspecified fitted 
model which assumes only response noise. The second parameter recovery (R2) involves a data 
generating model and correctly specified fitted model with both response and preference noise. 
The third parameter recovery (R3) involves a data generating model and correctly specified fitted 
model with only response noise.  
 
